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Abstract 
This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and 
cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and 
fixed size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public 
goods decision, affects social welfare. An efficient public good decision can always be 
accomplished by a majority voting scheme, where the number of "YES" votes required 
depends on the welfare weights in a simple way. The results are shown to have a natural 
geometry and an intuitive interpretation. We also extend these results to allow for 
restrictions on feasible transfer rules, ranging from the traditional unlimited transfers to 
the extreme case of no transfers. 
For a range of welfare weights, an optimal scheme is a two-stage procedure which 
combines a voting stage with a second stage where an even-chance lottery is used to 
determine who pays. We call this the "lottery draft mechanism". Since such a cost-
sharing scheme does not require transfers, it follows that in many cases transfers are 
not necessary to achieve the optimal allocation. For other ranges of welfare weights 
the second stage is more complicated, but the voting stage remains the same. If trans-
fers are completely infeasible, randomized voting rules may be optimal. The paper also 
provides a geometric characterization of the effects of voluntary participation constraints. 
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Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public 
Goods Mechanisms 
John 0. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey* 
1 Introduction 
Deciding whether or not to undertake and how to distribute the cost of a public project 
of fixed size is a classic problem in economics. This problem and variations on it have 
been at the center of attention of much of the work on optimal mechanism design under 
conditions of asymmetric information. Most of the work in the past has concentrated 
on the first question, 1 in the sense that optimality did not depend on the allocation of 
the private good. Utility was perfectly transferable through the private good, so cost 
distribution played a role only insofar as transfers provided a convenient way of relaxing 
incentive constraints. 
The results for that case have been, for the most part, rather satisfying. If utility is 
transferable via a private good, then dominant strategy mechanisms exist which fit the 
bill2 and which do not depend on prior information the players and the planner may have 
about the distribution of preferences for the public good. If the planner does have priors 
which are common knowledge among the players then there exist first best mechanisms 
if the players' preferences are statistically and functionally related in a particular way 
*This paper replaces an earlier version, entitled 'iOn the Optimality of Lottery Drafts: Character-
ization of Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem." We have benefited from comments by two 
referees and by seminar participants at Caltech, MIT, Northwestern, Texas, and Texas A&M, and the 
1989 FRET Conference in San Diego. We especially wish to acknowledge useful conversations with Kim 
Border and Ed Green. Ledyard gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Flight Projects 
Office of the Jet. Propulsion. Laboratory .of NASA .. Palfrey .. gratefuJJy .. acknowledges the support of the 
National Science Foundation under grants SES-8718657 and SES-8815097. 
1 Exceptions include the work of Groves and Ledyard [1977b], Hurwicz [1979], and others, but their 
use of Nash equilibrium is controversial when applied in environments with incomplete and asymmetric 
information. Recently Jackson and Moulin [1992] have addressed distributional concerns, in a complete 
information framework. 
2See Groves [1973], Green and Laffont [1979], and Groves and Ledyard [1977a] for descriptions of 
many of these- results, and for extensive commentary on the restrictive nature of the assumptions needed 
for the main results. One serious limitation is the lack of budget balance. 
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(d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1979,1982], d'Aspremont, Cremer, and Gerard-Varet 
[1990]). 
All these results share two basic assumptions. First, the welfare properties of the final 
allocation depend only on the level of public good, and not on the distribution of cost 
shares. Second, there are no feasibility limitations on the transfer schemes. In particular, 
bankruptcy and other problems that could restrict the set of feasible sidepayments, are 
ignored. 
In this paper, we relax both of these assumptions in the context of a Bayesian mecha-
nism design problem with two preference-types, a 0-1 public good decision, and statistical 
independence. First, we characterize the set of all interim incentive efficient allocation 
rules. We show that the earlier limitation to a welfare function that depends only on 
the public good allocation is equivalent to solving the second-best allocation problem for 
exactly one set of (interim) welfare weights.3 For any other choice of welfare weights, 
distributional considerations play a role, and the planner faces a tradeoff between using 
transfers to relax incentive constraints and using transfers to achieve distributional goals. 
We fully characterize the set of optimal allocation schemes for all welfare weights (The-
orem 6). Second, we show that the public good allocation rule depends on the welfare 
weights in a very simple way: The more the planner wants to shift the payment burden 
towards individuals who value the public good more, the less often the public good 1s 
produced (see the last two paragraphs of Section 3.1). 
Third, we investigate the implications of a wide class of restrictions on transfers, rang-
ing from the traditional case of no limitations to the extreme case where transfers are 
impossible. We find systematic effects of these restrictions, and show that the qualitative 
features of these effects depend on the welfare weights. For example, in the traditional 
case, where welfare weights are chosen so that there are no distributional concerns, the 
first best solution can be achieved without resorting to transfers at all (see the commen-
tary following corollary 9). More generally, however, transfers are needed to attain the 
second best solution. If transfer constraints are binding the solution is either first best 
or least cost in the sense that individuals who value the public good most a.re taxed to 
the limit (see Theorem 11). 
Fourth, we show that the decision whether to produce the public good can be sep-
arated from the transfer rule, and, in the model we consider, can be accomplished by 
j* majority voting scheme, where j*, the number of "YES" votes required, depends on 
the welfare weights. The results are shown to have a natural geometric interpretation. 
Furthermore, for a· wide -range of welfare-weights, an optimal scheme is a two-stage pro-
cedure, where first a vote is taken on whether to produce the public good. If the vote is 
to produce the public good, then a even-chance lottery is used to determine who pays. 
We call this the "lottery draft mechanism". Since such a cost-sharing scheme does not 
3 In asymmetric information models, these interim welfare weights depend on an individual's private 
information, or type. In our model, types are just preferences (marginal rates of substitution between 
the public and private good). 
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require transfers, it follows that in many cases transfers are not necessary to achieve the 
optimal allocation (see corollary 9). 
Finally, we investigate the implications of imposing voluntary participation con-
straints. From the geometric characterization obtained earlier in the paper, it is easy 
to establish several properties of the participation-constrained solution. In particular, it 
provides a transparent proof of the results obtained by Mailath and Postlewaite [1990] 
and Rob [1989], that in large economies participation constraints imply that the pub-
lic good will never be produced, unless it is common knowledge that a lottery draft 
mechanism does not violate participation constraints (see Section 4). 
2 The Problem 
2.1 Feasible A.llocations, Preferences, and Information 
A group of N people must decide whether or not to produce a discrete public good and 
who should pay for it. 
A feasible allocation for this problem is any vector ( X1, ... 'XN, y) E xN x { 0, 1} s~ch 
that 2::~1 Xi 2'. Ky, where Xi is the transfer (tax) paid by agent i, y is the amount of 
public good produced, f{ < N is a fixed constant, and X' is the set of feasible transfers 
an individual may pay. Here, y = 1 if the public good is produced, y = 0 otherwise and 
x; is the amount of private good that i contributes to the production of the public good. 
The set Xi of feasible transfers for i depends on wi, the initial endowment, and on the 
possibilities for transfers of the private good. For this paper we assume w' = 1 for all 
i. We consider two types of transfer assumptions. First, we consider what happens if 
unlimited transfers are permissible and Xi = ~, the real line. Second, we consider limited 
transfer schemes where X' C ~. Two special cases are: (1) no transfers at all,4 where 
X' = {O, 1 }, and (2) consumption lower bounds where Xi = (-oo, 1 ], which restricts 
taxation to no more than the private good endowment. In all cases we will assume that 
{0,1} c;;;x. 
Preferences of each individual depend upon whether or not the public good is pro-
duced and how much of the private good is available to be consumed by that individual. 
Individuals evaluate lotteries over outcomes using expected utility satisfying von Neu-
man Morgenstern axioms. In particular we assume if the probability that the project is 
built is q E [O, 1 ], i's endowment of the private good is w' and i's expected contribution 
is °'i E [O, 1 J then i's preferences can be represented by: 
Vi = q _ ViO'.i. 
Three facts shouid be noticed about this representation. First, as is sta11dar<l, we assume 
that an individual's preferences are quasi-linear in the private good. Second, as is also 
4This corresponds to an environment that has been studied extensively in laboratory experiments. 
See Palfrey and Rosenthal [199la, 199lb] and the references cited therein. 
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standard, we assume individuals are risk-neutral. The first implies that each utility 
function is of the form g'[h'(y) + w' - x']. The second implies that expected utility 
must be of the form Ai + r'q + vi(w' - o:i) where Ai, r' and vi are constants. The 
third fact is that we have normalized all utility functions so that ri = 1 and to eliminate 
(Ai+viwi). An alternative normalization, used by Clarke [1971] Groves [1973] and others, 
is v(q) = c'q - a'. Since any linear transformation preserves preferences satisfying the 
axioms of expected utility, these represent the same preferences. 
To simplify the problem, we restrict our attention in this paper to the two-type case5 
where V = { v1, v2 } and 0 < v1 < v2 • We will call v1 the low type and v2 the high type. 
To make the problem interesting, we assume that 1 2: ~v1 . Finally, we assume w' = 1 
for all i. 
We assume that the individual marginal rates of substitution, v;, are private infor-
mation, and that these are independently drawn from an identical distribution where 
7r E (0, 1) is the probability of a low type. 
2.2 Mechanisms 
How might we choose an allocation ( x1 , .•• , Xn, y )? Many natural possibilities exist, even 
if transfers are not possible. Perhaps the most familiar such mechanism is the voluntary 
- - - - -- -- -
contribution mechanism. Each individual voluntarily pays Xi and y is produced if and 
only if L:!':,1 Xi 2: K. Each i pays x;. Another simple mechanism is a ( conditiona0 
lottery draft where y is produced with some probability, q, which does not depend on 
the information of the individuals. Then if y = 1, J{ individuals are randomly selected 
and their Xi = w' = 1 while Xi = 0 for the others. Both the voluntary contribution 
mechanism and the lottery draft are examples of mechanisms which do not use transfers 
of the private good between individuals. A somewhat different no transfer mechanism 
is the least cost mechanism. Each i is asked to report her marginal rate of substitution, 
vi, of the public for the private good. If the public good is produced, these rates are 
ranked and the K lowest are required to pay Xi = wi = l; the others pay nothing. If 
individuals correctly report their v', this might produce superior allocations to, say, the 
lottery draft. Unfortunately there is an incentive to misreport. 
Economic theory suggests that using transfers can reduce the incentive to misreport 
in the last mechanism by compensating one type through taxes on the other type. Of 
course, if transfers are possible then we can improve things even more by transferring 
(arbitrarily) large amounts of the private good from the low v' types to high vi types - if 
vi represents the social marginal cost of Xi - in which case a first best solution does not 
exist. Only if the welfare function is such that the marginal social cost of a transfer is the 
same for both types does a first-best solution exist, since, in this special case, no social 
gains or losses result from transfers. This is precisely what has been analyzed extensively 
by economists with a key contribution being made by d' Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 
5 For some results with continuous-types, see Ledyard and Palfrey [1989]. 
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[1979]. In this special case, the first-best solution is any ( x, y) satisfying y = 1 if and only 
if 2:~1 ;!; 2': K. A mechanism provided by d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet produces the 
first-best choice of y and provides incentives through the cost allocation x1 , ... , Xn, for 
each i to correctly identify her vi. To our knowledge no one has studied how to do this 
generally under conditions of asymmetric information when the social costs of transfers 
differ across types. We turn to that now. 
To find the optimal mechanism for the public good problem one might begin by trying 
to identify the space of all possible mechanisms. Luckily that is not necessary. Using the 
Revelation Principle,6 it can be shown that any allocation rule which can be attained as 
the Bayes-equilibrium of some mechanism can also be attained as the Bayes-equilibrium of 
a direct revelation mechanism: direct mechanisms which satisfy Incentive Compatibility 
Constraints. 7 Direct mechanisms (each of which uniquely defines our allocation rule) 
assign a probability measure over feasible allocations to every possible profile of types. 
Now since { v1 , v2 } is the set of possible types, a feasible direct mechanism is 
µ : {vi, v2}N ---> M( Z) 
where Z = {(x,y) E XN x {O, 1} 12=~1 x; 2': Ky}, and M(Z) is the set of all probability 
measures on Z. Because lotteries between asymmetric mechanisms are possible and 
we are interested in symmetric welfare functions, we restrict attention to symmetric 
mechanisms whereby individuals are treated differentlyonly if they have different v;'s. 
This is justified by lemmas 1 and 2 in the appendix. 
We can represent any direct symmetric mechanism by a collection of N + 1 triples 
{ {a], a], qj}} :
0
, where . 
a]= (expected) payment by a low type if there are exactly j low types and (N - j) high 
types. 
aJ= (expected) payment by a high type if there are exactly j low types and (N - j) 
high types. 
qj= probability the public good is produced if there are exactly j low types and ( N - j) 
high types. 
We represent mechanisms in this form by 
TJ is feasible if and only if there is a feasible symmetric direct mechanism µ which yields 
T/· It is shown in the appendix, lemma 11, that T/ is feasible iff, fork= 0, ... , N, 
qk E [O, 1] (1.1) 
6See Gibbard [1973] or Harris and Townsend [1981]. 
7 We do, nevertheless, return to other mechanisms below. 
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and, for k = 1, ... , N - 1, 
kak + ( N - k )a% 2: I< qk 
a~=O,aRr=O 
and a~ EA:= CO(X) for i = 1,2 
{ 
I< - (N -k)x} { -(N - k)x} 
at 2: qkmax ;r_, k + (1 - qk )max ;r_, k 
a% 2: qkmax { ;r_, I~~ k:} + (1 - qk)max { ;r_, ;:xk} 
where ;r_ = min{xtX}, x = max{uX}, and CO(X) is the convex hull of X; 
A= [;r_, x]. 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
that is, 
There are three special cases of interest. If unlimited transfers are possible then 
A = X = (-oo, +oo) and (1.5) and (1.6) are never binding. If there are lower bounds 
on consumption then A = X = (-oo, 1 J and, again, (1.5) and (1.6) do not bind. If 
no transfers are possible, X = {O, 1}, A = [O, 1] and (1.5) and (1.6) may come into 
play as ai 2: qkmax { 0, K-(:-k)} and at 2: qkmax { 0, ~::z}. The necessity for (1.5) and 
(1.6) arises because of the fact that yt{O, 1}. If large subsidies or taxes are possible 
then lotteries and transfers can be used to convexif:y everything without (1.5) and (1.6). 
Limited transfers and discreteness of either or both X a.rid feasible y requires additional 
care. 
2.3 Feasible Reduced-form Allocation Rules: 
An individual's interim8 expected utility depends only on her type and two "reduced 
form" numbers representing that individual's expected transfer and the probability of 
public good production, given her type. Denoting these by (Q 1 , ai) and (Q 2 , a 2 ) respec-
tively for the two types, we have 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
8 Interim means i knows her own Vi but not that of the others. 
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We will say ( Q, a) is a feasible reduced form if and only if there exists a feasible 17 = 
( a1 , a2, q) such that (2) and (3) are true. We will say Q is feasible if and only if :lqk E 
[O, 1 ]V'k such that (2) is true. We illustrate reduced forms with three examples: 
1. Lindahl-optimal public good production ( Q0 ). According to this production rule, the 
public good is produced if and only if the sum of the marginal rates of substitution, 
L:i=l ~, exceeds the marginal rate of transformation, I<. Letting j :S: N denote the 
number of low cost types, this says that q = 1 if and only if .i... + N-j > I<, or q = 1 
v1 v2 -
if and only if j ?:. j 0 = max { 0, vi <~;~v~N) }. Thus, ( Q'{, Q2) is given by: 
N-1 ( N - l 
Q'{ = I: . 
j=j0-1 J 
2. Conditional Lottery Draft ( QL, aL). Under this rule the good is produced if and only 
if j ?:. j*, where j* is some fixed number between 0 and n. If it is produced, taxes are 
raised by randomly "drafting" I< individuals a:nd taxing their entire eridowllleht. 
Thus (Qf, Qf) is given just as in Q0 , except with j* replacing j 0 , and (af, af) = 
(~Qf' ~Qf). 
3. Conditional Least Cost Mechanism (QLc, aL0 ). In this case, QLC = QL, given j*, 
but whenever possible vi-types are taxed. The only time v2-types are taxed is when 
the number of v1-types is less than I<, but greater than j*. Thus: 
LC _ ~1 ( N - 1 ) j(l _ )N-j-1 · {l J() G'1 - L . Jr 7r m1n , . } 
j=j'-1 J J J 
Finally, observe that in all of the above examples, the budget balances. This is 
not required by feasibility. For example, the disastrous reduced form mechanism 
Qi = Qz = 0, a1 = a2 = 1 is a feasible reduced form. However, as we will show 
below, "budget balance" is implied by interim incentive efficiency. 
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2.4 Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules: 
Because interim utility depends only on Q, a and Vi, we call V(Q, a, Vi)= Q; - C>iVi the 
interim utility for type v;. A reduced form allocation rule (Q,a) is incentive compat-
ible if and only if, for all v;, v;, E T, V(Q, a, v;) 2 Q; - a;v;. Observe that incentive 
compatibility of ( Q, a) is independent of the particular normalization of utility. 
In addition to feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints, it is a common 
practice to impose some sort of requirement on the mechanism that participation be 
voluntary. 9 This may be interpreted as either a conservative judgement by the planiier 
respecting prior "utility claims" of the individual, restrictions based on legal standards 
respecting property rights, or a lack of sufficient enforcement power by the planner to 
impose such allocations. In Section 3, we will solve the optimal mechanism problem 
in the absence of any such constraints. In Section 4 we will analyze exactly how these 
constraints affect the properties of the optimal mechanism. 
2.5 Optimality 
In this paper, we characterize the interim incentive efficient frontier corresponding to all 
type-dependent welfare weights that are symmetric across individuals (i.e. anonymous).10 
For ourproblem (see Holmstrom and Myerson [1983]), this means that for each ,\ 2 0 
we look for reduced form allocation rules that maximize 
(E) 
subject to incentive compatibility and feasibility. One might wonder why, instead of 
mapping out the (symmetric) interim efficiency frontier we do not simply find an. ex 
ante optimal symmetric mechanism as in Myerson [1981] and Myerson and Satterthwaite 
[1983]. Actually, in our problem, the ex ante optimal allocation rule is simply a particular 
point on the interim efficiency frontier, corresponding to ,\ = 1. In fact, each of the 
other points on the frontier (,\ =I 1) corresponds to an ex ante optimal allocation rule 
for a different normalization of the utility functions.11 For example, the allocation rule 
that maximizes (E) subject to incentive compatibility and feasibility when ,\ = v2 /v1 
corresponds to the ex ante incentive efficient rule in the case where utility functions are 
normalized as in Green-Laffont or d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (riq - ai) instead of our 
normalization ( q - viai). In this sense, one can view our approach of characterizing the 
9 Rob [1989] and Mailath and Postlewaite. [1990] have.recently. analy,zed these.constraints in the context 
of public goods problems. Much of the initial work on optimal public goods mechanisms did not impose 
individual rationality constraints. 
10We do not address the problem of optimal mechanisms with welfare weights that may depend on 
individual as well as type. Also, at least in the unlimited transfer case, optimal mechanisms may fail 
to exist with asymmetric weights, since optimality would call for arbitrarily large type-independent 
transfers between agents. 
11See d' Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1989] for a related discussion. 
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symmetric interim efficient frontier as equivalent to characterizing the set of allocation 
rules that are ex ante efficient for some normalization of the utility functions. 12 
2.6 Summary 
Bringing together all the assumptions, comments, and observations above, we can sum-
marize the problem of characterizing all interim-efficient public good production and cost 
allocation mechanisms. The main points follow. 
1. We assume agents satisfy the expected utility hypothesis (they act as if they max-
imize expected utility) with risk-neutral, quasi-linear preferences. 
2. The revelation principle and the hypothesis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium behavior al-
low us to restrict attention to feasible and incentive compatible direct mechanisms. 
3. We restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms. 
4. There are only 2 types. 
5. We are interested in the class of symmetric interim efficient mechanisms for the 
normalization ui = q - viai. This is equivale11t to tl1e class of symmetric ex ante 
efficient mechanisms for all riormalizatioiis. 
We can, therefore, solve our problem in two steps. First, for each ,\ > 0: choose the 
reduced form (Q, a) to solve 
subject to: 
Qi - V1a1 ;::: Q2 - v1a2 
Q2 - v2a2 ;::: Qi - v2a1 
(Q, a) feasible 
( 4.1) 
(4.2) 
(1) -{3) 
where (4.1)-(4.2) require (Q, a) to be incentive compatible. Second, construct a feasible 
direct mechanismµ which implements the optimal solution to (P). We turn to the first 
of these tasks next. 
12Implicit in this statement -is that. the-.choice--of ,normalization ,is the same--across agents. The im-
plications of considering different normalizations for different individuals in the ex ante optimization 
problem are similar to the implications of nonanonymous type-dependent welfare weights in our interim 
optimization problem. 
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3 Characterization of Optimal Rules 
In this section we characterize the class of interim-efficient, incentive-compatible mecha-
nisms for public good provision and cost allocation under a variety of different assump-
tions about transferability of the private good. We do this by substituting a simpler but 
equivalent problem for (P). 
First, we rewrite (4.1) and (4.2) using two results. Incentive compatibility immedi-
ately implies that Qi 2 Q2 and ai 2 a 2. This is a standard result and is proved in 
Lemma 3 of the appendix. Second, in Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 we prove that any solution 
to (P) must satisfy a= ~Q, where a= ?rai + (1 - ?r)a2 and Q = ?rQi + (1 - ?r)Q2. 
That is, there is no waste. Production always takes place on the production possibilities 
frontier. This simplifies the analysis. Substituting a= ~Q into 4.1 and 4.2 gives: 
a, ::; ~Q + v~ (1 - ?r)(Qi - Q2) = ICu(Q) 
a, 2 ~Q + :, (1 - 1r)(Q, - Q2) = ICL(Q). 
Notice that Qi 2 Q2 =} ICu(Q) 2 ICL(Q) which is also true with strict inequalities, 
A second set of constraints relate to feasibility. The first such constraint is on Q = 
(Q1 , Q2)aiid comes from (Ll), (2.1), and (2.2). w~ represent the set of feasible (Q,, Q2 ) 
in the following way. For any Q, E [0,1] define Q2(Qi) = min{Q2l:i q= (qo, ... ,qN) 
feasible such that Q2 = Q2(q) and Q1 = Q1(q)}. This function is well defined since the 
set of feasible q is compact and Q1(q) and Q2(q), as defined by (2) and (3), are both 
continuous in q and the set of q such that Q1 = Q1 ( q) is nonempty for al! Qi E [O, l]. 
Define 
It follows immediately from definitions that Q E Qp if and only if Q is a feasible 
reduced form and Q1 2 Q2. The set Qp is illustrated in Figure 1. We summarize the 
properties of Q p in the following proposition: 
Proposition: Q F is a convex polygon, with a boundary defined by N + 1 vertices that 
correspond to the j* conditional mechanisms: 
10 
forj*=0,1, ... ,N. 
Proof: By the definitions of Q1 and Q2 in equations (1) and (2), one can characterize 
Q2(Q1) in terms of q0, ... ,qN. Specifically, for Q1 ::::; 1i"N-', we get Q2(Q1) = 0, since 
we can produce (Q 1,0) in this region by setting q0 , ••. ,qN-l all equal to 0, and setting 
qN = ,,~:. 1 • For any Q1 > 1i"N-', Q2(Q 1 ) must be strictly positive because q; > 0 for some 
i < N. For values of Q1 > 1i"N-', Q (Q 1 ) is constrained by setting qN = 1 and choosing 
-2 
ql, ... , qN - l to minimize 
subject to 
q;E[0,1] j=l, ... ,N-1 
Since ~~~j~:; = ~~1-=:l) is decreasing in j, the solution to this linear minimization 
problem is given by a pair (j*, 0) such that q; = 1 for N 2 j > j*, q; = 0 for 0 ::::; j < j* 
and q; = 0 for j = j*. The result follows immediately. I 
The other constraints involve joint restrictions on Q and a that depend on the re-
strictions on transfers. Specifically, we show in Lemma 7 that there exist piecewise linear 
functions, L(Q) and U(Q) such that (Q, a) is feasible and a= ~Q if and only if Q E Qp 
and L( Q) ::::; a 1 ::::; U( Q). This is a reduced-form representation of the constraints on 
transfers, and will depend on the possibilities for transfers (the set A*). For example, 
with unlimited transfers, L(Q) = -oo and U(Q) = oo for all Q, so the constraints are 
never binding. Things are more complicated in the no bankruptcy and no transfers 
cases, which are taken up later. 
From above, we can replace (1)-(3) in (P), and write a simplified reduced form prob-
lem ( R) for each A > 0, as: choose ( Q, a 1) to 
(R) maximize 7rQ1 [A - ~ v2] + (1 - 11" )Q2 [1 - ~ v2] + 7r( v2 - Av1)a1 
subject to 
a1 ::::; ICu(Q) 
a 1 2 ICL(Q) 
Q E Qp 
L(Q)::::; a 1 ::::; U(Q) 
( 4.1) 
(4.2) 
(5.2) 
The constraints (5.1) and (5.2), replace (1) (2) and (3) in (P). It is easy to show: 
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Theorem 1 (Q,a1 ) solves (R) and a 2 
(P). 1 ~~(~Q - ?l'a1) if and only if (Q, a) solves 
Proof: Uses lemmas 3, 5, 6, and 7. I 
Thus the solutions to (R) for (Q,a1) as we vary,\ E [O,oo) characterize all interim-
efficient mechanisms. Since (5.2) depends on the set of feasible transfers, we split the 
characterization into two parts: unlimited and limited transfers. 
3.1 Unconstrained Transfers of the Private Good 
By unconstrained transfers, we mean that a~ can be any real number. That is A* = 
~ and (a, q) is feasible iff (1.1)-(1.4). Implicitly, this means that the private good is 
continuous rather than lumpy, and there are no lower or upper bounds on any individual's 
consumption. 
In this case L(Q) = -oo and U(Q) = oo, so constraint (5.2) drops out. The solution 
to ( R) can be split into three cases which depend on the value of A, the welfare weight 
placed on low cost types. 
Theorem 2 If,\ < ;;;- , ( Q, a) is an optimal mechanism if and only if: 
(A) 
and Q maximizes 
a1 = !Cu(Q) 
/{_ 
O'= -Q N 
?T'Q1 [,\- ~v2] + (l -1T')Q2 [1- ~v2] +1T'(v2 -Av1)ICu(Q) 
subject to Q E QF. 
Proof: Since V2 > AV1 we want a 1 to be as large as possible for any Q, subject to incentive 
compatibility. Therefore a 1 = !Cu( Q). Then ( 4.2) is not binding. Substitute for a 1 in 
the objective function and eliminate (5.2) in (R) to finish. I 
Theorem 3 If,\>;;;-, then (Q,a) is an optimal mechanism if and only if: 
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(A') 
and Q maximizes 
[{_ 
a=-Q 
N 
7rQ1 [A - ~ v2] + (1 - 7r)Q2 [1 - ~ v2] + 7r(v2 - .Av1)ICL(Q) 
subject to Q E QF. 
Proof: Same as proof of Theorem 1 but a 1 is now chosen as small as possible so ( 4.2) 
binds, and (4.1) is slack. ill 
Theorem 4 If .Av1 = v2, then (Q, a) is an optimal mechanism if and only if: 
(A") 
and Q maximizes 
subject to Q E QF. 
[{_ 
a=-Q 
N 
[ 1 /{l .. ·r1 /{i· 7r --- Qi+(l-7r) --- Q2 
V1 N V2 N 
Proof: Substitution of £1. for A in the objective function eliminates a from the objective v, 
function, so the optimal Q is compatible with a range of a's. This results in a first 
best solution, since the incentive compatibility constraints can be satisfied with strict 
inequality. I 
Several observations can be made. With unlimited transfers (and a linear utility 
structure) the private good is used to transfer welfare subject to incentive compatibility 
constraints. For example, if .Av1 < v2 and if incentives were not an issue, optimality 
would require an infinite transfer from low-cost types to high cost types, no matter 
what Q is. But then low types would pretend to be high types. That incentive to 
misrepresent is prevented by the incentive constraint (4.1 ). Thus, the private good is 
always transferred to the extent allowed by incentive constraints. This determines an 
optimal incentive compatible financing scheme for each possible Q. Then Q is chosen so 
the welfare from Q net of the loss from its financing is optimal. At this point, the only 
incentive constraint is Q1 ~ Q2 • This means that the ciass of interim efficient mechanisms 
is simply represented by the boundary of QF. The only role incentive compatibility plays 
is to rule out mechanisms where Q2 > Q1 • It is not until one wants to select a mechanism 
for a particular welfare weight, .A, on low types that the actual incentive constraints 
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become important. Then, they have a similar effect to that noticed by Myerson [1981]. 
They create a new "virtual utility" function but do not affect the feasible set. 
We have the following summary Theorem,13 which is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Theorem 5 The set of interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost 
allocation with unlimited transfers is {(Q,a)IQ E lower boundary ofQF, and (Q,a) is 
incentive compatible } . For almost all ..\, the interim efficient mechanism is a vertex of 
QF. 
This completes the first step in solving (P). The second step involves identifying direct 
(non-reduced form) mechanisms which yield the desired reduced form. The following 
result shows how to do this. 
Theorem 6 For any parameters (I<, N, 1l', v;, v2, ..\) there exists a j* such that it is in-
terim efficient to produce the public good if and only if j ::'.'. j*. 
Proof: Recall that Q F is a convex polygon, with a boundary consisting of N + 1 vertices. 
Since the objective functions are linear in Q1 and Q 2 and the boundary of Q F is piecewise 
linear, the objective function achieves its maximum at a vertex for all maximization 
problems in Theorems 2, 3, and 4. II 
We can see that there are only two kinds of mechanisms that solve our problem. In 
the first kind, the good is always produced, Q 1 = Q 2 = 1, and can be financed by a 
lottery draft, ai =ah= jfy. Pooling of types is efficient and, in Theorem 6, j* = 0. More 
precisely, 
Corollary 7 If..\ .S ~, then qj = 1, a] = jfy, a] = jfy Vj is an optimal solution to (P) if 
and only if 
[ l _ /{vi] > ( V2 - v1) N - A1l'V1 + (1 - 1r)V2 
Proof: From Theorem 2, if..\ .S ~' the objective function is 
/{ /{ 
E(Q1, Q2) = 1rQ1(..\ - N v2) + (1 - K)Q2(l - N v2) + K(v2 - ..\v1)ICu(Q) 
Notice that 8E/fJQ1 =1r(_!__ KN)(..\v1ir+(l-K.)v2) >-0. ThereforeQ* = (1,1) is optimal Vj 
if and only if fJE / 8Q2 ::'.'. 0. The result follows immediately since 
fJE/8Q2 = (1- ir) [ (,~1 - ~) (..\v11l' + (1- K)v2)- (v2 ~vi)]. 
II 
13We conjecture that this theorem is also true for a continuum of types. The only technical problem 
in proving this is characterizing Qp. See Ledyard and Palfrey [1989]. 
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Corollary 8 If,\>;;;, then q; = 1, a]=~' a]=~ Vj is an optimal solution to (P) if 
and only if 1 ?: ~v2. 
Proof: From Theorem 3, when ,\ ?: ;;;, the objective function is 
Now 
and 
aE/aQ2 = (1 - Jr) [(1- ~v2)(-\v1Jr + (1 - 7r)v2)] /v2. 
To show (if), notice that if 1 > ~ v2 then ;~ > 0 and ;g, ?: 0. To show 
observe that if 1 < ~v2 then ;g, < 0, so Q = (1, 1) cannot be optimal. 
(only if), 
II 
For comparison to Corollary 7, note that 1 ?: ~v2 iff [1 - ~v1 ] ?: <"2;,"rl. An 
interesting implication of Corollaries 7 and 8 is that if 1 < ~v2 then Q* = (1, 1) is never 
optimal. Lottery drafts with Q = 1 are never optimal when it is ex post inefficient to 
produce the public good if everyone is a high-cost type. 
In the second kind of mechanism, the good is not produced unless there are sufficiently 
many low cost types. This happens if it is less costly to induce revelation of preference 
by restricting production when there are too many high-types than by using the priv.ate 
good. This will be true if the (relative) welfare weight on the high cost type is large 
enough so that it is important to avoid lotteries (pooling) and to differentiate between 
types (separating). More precisely, 
v1 1TV1 ( -1r v2 Corollary 9 If,\'.::: "2 and [1 - KNv~ < ,\ (v~-;vr)) , then the optimal mechanism is to 
produce the public good if and only i the number of low types is larger than j*, with j* 
equal to the smallest j such that 
j (1 - ~v1)(-\Jrv1 + (1 - 7r)v2) 
-> 1- . N- (v2-v1) 
Proof: From Figure 1 we want theoSmallest j such,that the slope< of the <indifference lines 
of the objective function is greater than or equal to the slope of the constraint set, given 
by the boundary of QF. That is, we want the smallest j such that 
---,,,-,---Jr~[~1--_,~-v1~]_[_.A_r._v_1 _+_( l_-_-_" _)v_<2_] __ -, > ( N - j)Jr 
[1- Jr] [[1- ~v1 ] [-\7rv1 + (1- Jr)v2] + [v1 -v2J] - j(l - Jr) 
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II 
An analogous result holds if A 2 ~. In particular j* is the smallest j such that 
]_ > -(1 - j&v2)(A1rv1 + (1 - 7r)v2) 
N - A(v2 -v1) 
There are two interesting special cases. If A= .!!>.,we have the transfer-neutral model, 
VJ 
which turns out to be the knife-edge case that separates Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. That 
is, individual utilities are normalized to ciqi - o:i so that every type's marginal utility 
of the private good is 1, and the welfare function is the expected value of ciq - o:'. In 
this case A'll'V1 + (1 - 7l' )v2 = v2. To find the optimal mechanism as in Corollary 9, we 
want the minimumj 2 0 such that j [1 - ~v1] v2 + (N -j) [[1 - j&v1] V2 - (v2 - v1)] 2 
0. That is, we want the minimum j such that j [;J - J&] + (N - j) [;, - ~ 2 o] or 
j [c1 - ~] + (N - j) [c2 - J&] 2 0. But this is just the first best solution: the good 1s 
produced if and only if jc1 + (N - j)c2 2 I<. 
With A = .!!>., the range of cost allocations which induce incentive compatibility is 
VJ 
given in Theorem 4. A particularly simple mechanism is a lottery14 where J{ of the 
N individuals are randomly selected to pay for the public good, whenever at least j* 
individuals report that they are low-cost types. One can interpret this as a conditional 
lottery draft, that is preceded by a vote between producing and not producing the public 
good. The vote outcome is determined by a weighted majority rule where j* of N must 
vote in favor, in order for production to arise. Low cost types vote for it and high cost 
K K · types vote against it. This corresponds to o:1 = NQi, and o:2 = NQ2, and does satisfy 
incentive compatibility. 
A second interesting case occurs when A = l (covered by Theorem 2): the problem 
studied in the social dilemma literature. 15 In this case we find that, even if 1- ~v2 2 0, 
and therefore it is common knowledge that benefits exceed costs with probability 1, it 
may be optimal not to produce with probability 1. In fact if A < ~ and ( v2 - v1) > 
[1 - ~v1 ] [7rv1 + (1- 7r)v2] then Q2 < Q1 < 1 in the optimal mechanism.16 The reason 
is simple: The distribution of taxes is more important than optimal production. 
As A changes, the feasible set Qp does not change but the slope of the indifference 
lines of the objective function does change. As A increases, the indifference lines become 
steeper (see Lemma 8 in the appendix), so the expected output of the optimal mechanism 
(weakly) increases.17 There is no discontinuity at Av1 = v2. 
14If the private good were divisible 1 each member could be taxed an amount!{/ N from their endow-
ment whenever the public good is produced. 
15See Van de Kragt, Orbell and Dawes [1983], Palfrey and Rosenthal [1984, 1988, 1990, 1991] and 
Rapoport [1985]. 
16To see that these condition::;; are not vacuous pick 7r large, v1 smaiii and V2 ciose to 1. 
17It is easy to see a similar effect happens if J{ is decreased or N is increased or v2 decreases or r 
increases. Of course when Nor 1T are increased, Qp changes. 
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An increase in A implies a higher welfare weight on low cost types, who like output 
relatively more than the high cost types. Only for A = ( v2f v1), are there no welfare gains 
from redistribution of the private good. For A> (v2/v1 ) the low cost types are relatively 
more important and, therefore, the efficient mechanism may provide an expected output 
higher than first best, resulting in overproduction of the public good. For A < ( v2 /vt) 
the high cost types are relatively more important and, therefore, the efficient mechanism 
provides an expected output lower than first best, resulting in underproduction of the 
public good. Interim efficiency does not necessarily imply the first best solution because 
of the trade-off between the use of transfer payments for incentive compatibility and 
possible welfare gains from cost allocation. 
3.2 Limited Transfers of the Private Good 
In many applications it is illegal or impossible to fully compensate individuals who con-
tribute to the production of the public good. In pure voluntary contributions situations 
no compensation is possible so X = {O, 1} (A = [O, 1 ]); an agent can only contribute or 
not18 (perhaps with some probability). A less restrictive situation arises when compensa-
tion is possible but taxation is limited by a no-bankruptcy condition so that no taxation 
is allowed which would leave an agent with negative amounts of the private good. Here 
X = (-oo, 1]; an agent cannot be taxed more than the initial endowment. 
The impact of constraints on possible transfers can be easily seen by referring to the 
maximization problem (R) in Section 3.0, particularly constraint (5.2). Under limited 
transfers L(Q) > -oo and U(Q) < oo, and it is possible that (5.2) will bind at the 
optimum. If Av1 < v2 then the solution to (R) will involve making a 1 as large as 
possible, whatever Q E Qi is chosen. Thus a 1 will equal the smaller of U(Q) or ~Q + 
v~ (1 - ir)(Q1 - Qz). An analogous condition holds if Av1 > v2 • Of course Q must be 
restricted so that an a 1 satisfying ( 4) and (5) exists but, as we will soon see, if Q E QF 
we will not need to worry about that when lottery drafts are a feasible financing option, 
i.e. when [O, 1] ~ X. To formalize this intuition define: 
and 
and 
H(Q) =max {L(Q), ICL(Q)} 
G(Q) =min {U(Q), ICu(Q)} 
{ 
H(Q) 
S(Q,A) = G(Q) if AV1 > V2 if Av1 < Vz. 
When AV1 = v2, let S(Q,A) be any number such that19 S E [H(Q),G(Q)J. The 
18If we assume divisibility (-Y = [O, 1)) then an agent can contribute part of his endown1ent. Since 
A = [O, l], the formal results for the limited transfer case are the same whether or not divisibility is 
assumed. With divisibility, it would be possible to tax K/ N of each individual's private good endowment. 
19When Q E Qp, ~Qi E [H(Q), G(Q)J. So if lottery drafts are feasible, then [H(Q), G(Q)] # 0 for 
all Q E Qp. 
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following theorem generalizes Theorems 2,3, and 4 to any limitations on transfers such 
that [O, 1] <; A. 
Theorem 10 Let [O, 1) <;A. (Q,a) is an interim efficient mechanism for.\ (that is, it 
solves (R)) if and only if a solves 
(A') 
and Q solves 
ai = S(Q,.\) 
]{_ 
a=-Q 
N 
(C) max 7rQi [.x - ~ v2] + (1 - 7r)Q 2 [1 - ~ v2] + 7r(v2 - Avi)S(Q, ,\) 
subject to 
Proof: Case 1: .\vi > v2 • We need ai satisfying (4) and (5) and as small as possible. 
This means that whatever Q is chosen, we want ai = H( Q). Substitute this for ai in 
the objective function of (R). 
We can find such an ai satisfying (4) and (5) for a given Q if and onlyif 
ICL(Q) '.S U(Q) 
!Cu(Q) 2 L(Q) 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
By Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, (6.2) is true for all Q E QF. By Lemma 10, if 1 :::; ~v2 
then (6.1) is true for all Q E QF. If 1 2 ~v2 , we know from Corollary 8 that Q* = (1, 1) 
is optimal if (5) is ignored. But (5) is satisfied at Q* = (1, 1 ). 
Case 2: .\vi = v2 • Using the same analysis as that following Corollary 9 in Section 3.1, 
the first best solution is attainable with a lottery draft. (See footnote 15.) 
Case 3: .\vi < v2 • Here we need ai as large as possible subject to ( 4) and (5). Let 
ai = G(Q). In order for such an ai to be feasible, Q must satisfy (6). By Lemmas 
9 and 10, (6.2) is true for any Q E QF. By Lemma 10, if 1 :S ~v2 then (6.1) is 
true for Q E QF. If 1 > ~v2 , suppose (6.1) is binding at the optimum to (R). Then 
ICL(Q) = U(Q) < ICu(Q) and Qi> Q2 since if Qi= Q2, then ~Q =~Qi < U(Q) and 
(6.1) would not bind. Now ,consider .a change from the optimal Q caused by increasing 
Q2 slightly. Since ai = U( Q) < !Cu( Q), the objective function changes by 
6.Q2 · [(1 - ]{ v2)(l - ?r) + 7r(v2 - .\vi)8U/8Q21 · N , 
Since 1 > j&v2 and au I 8Q2 2 0, an increase in Q2 increases the objective function. Fur-
ther the left-hand side of (6.1) declines as Q2 increases and the right hand side increases 
as Q 2 increases. Therefore (6.1) can not bind at an optimum. I 
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Several questions now arise, including: 
1. When is the interim-efficient mechanism for limited transfers the same as that for 
unlimited transfers? 
2. Is the characterization in Theorem 6 still valid with limited transfers? 
We already know when ;\v1 = v2 , as long as [O, 1] ~ A, the first-best output financed 
by a lottery-draft is an interim efficient mechanism. Limitations on transfers have no 
effect and the analysis of Section 3.1 remains valid. If ;\v1 # v2 , that is no longer trne. 
Suppose we were to solve (R) ignoring the transfer constraints (5.2). This is the 
unlimited transfer solution (Q*,a*). If ;\v1 < v2 and U(Q*) 2: ICu(Q*) then Q* ~lso 
solves (R). If ;\v1 > v2 and L(Q*) < ICL(Q*) then Q* also solves (R). Therefore, one 
possibility is that transfer limitation will have no effect. 
Next, define the (modified) first-best solution as that (Q, a) which solves20 
J( J{ 
max 1rQ1(;\ - Nvz) + (1 - ?r)Q2(l - Nv2) + ?r(v2 - ;\v1)a1 
subject to Q E QF, a = ~Q, and L(Q) ::; a 1 ::; U(Q). Suppose ;\v1 < v,, Q** 
is the modified first best solution, and U(Q**) < ICu(Q**), Or alternatively ;\v1 > v2 
and L(Q**) 2: ICL(Q**) Then Q** solves (R). This gives us a second class of possible 
solutions. 
The intuition behind these two cases is straightforward. If, for example, ;\v1 < v2 
then relatively more weight is placed on high cost types so that the optimal solution 
(without incentive constraints) makes a 1 as large as possible. If transfer constraints are 
tight and that transfer is incentive compatible then the modified first best solution is 
optimal and this is the end of the story. If, however, large transfers are possible then 
as a1 is increased incentive-compatibility eventually bites. Once that happens, transfer 
limits become irrelevant. For ;\v1 < v,, when ICu(Q) < U(Q) the production Q must be 
financed subject to incentive compatibility. 
There does remain, however, a third possibility21 where, for ;\v1 < v2 , 
U(Q*) < ICu(Q*) 
20 A true first best optimization would allow Q1 < Q2. 
21 A fourth possibility, where both 
U(Q') ='.'. ICu(Q') 
and 
U(Q") :<:'. ICu(Q") 
with one strict inequality cannot happen. If it could, then 
trQ1' (>. - f,v2) + (1- tr)Q2 (1- f,v2) + tr(v2 -,\vi)ICu(Q') 
='.'. trQ1" (>. - f,v2) + (1- tr)Q,'' (1- f,v2) + tr(v2 - Av1)ICu(Q") 
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and 
U(Q**) > ICu(Q**) 
Consider the revised problems and solutions where Q solves max 7rQ1 (>.- ~v2) + (~ -
7r)Q2 (1 - tv2) + 7r(v2 - >.v,)ICu(Q) subject to Q E Qp and ICu(Q) ::; U(Q), and 
where Q solves max 7rQ1 ( >. - tv2) + (1 - 7r )Q2 ( 1 - t v2) + 7r( v2 - >.v,)U( Q) subject to 
U(Q)::; ICu(Q). If either ICu(Q) < U(Q) or ICu(Q) > U(Q) then we are in a previous 
case. Therefore ICu(Q = U(Q) and ICu(Q) = U(Q). Thus, Q = Q. 
We can now answer our first question for >.v, < v2. 
Theorem 11 (a) Let Q solve 
max 7rQ1 ( >. - ~v2) + (1- 7r)Q2 (i - ~v2) + 7r(v2 - >.v,)ICu(Q) 
subject to Q E Qp and ICu(Q) ::; U(Q). If ICu(Q < U(Q) then Q is interim efficient 
and Q is the same as if there were no limits on transfers. 
(b) Let Q solve max 7rQ1 (>.- ~v2) +(l-7r)Q2 (1- tv2) +7r(v2->.v,)U(Q) subject 
to Q E Qp and U(Q) ::; ICu(Q). If U(Q) < ICu(Q) + ;
1 
(1 - 7r)(Q1 - Q2) then Q is 
interim-efficient and Q is the first best solution (subject to Q1 2 Cb). 
(c) If ICu(Q) = U(Q) in (a) and if ICL(Q) = U(Q) in (b), then Q = Q is the 
interim efficient for>. and may be neither first best nor identical to the unlimited transfer 
solution. 
(d) ICu(Q) < U(Q) and ICL(Q) > U(Q) not possible. 
Proof: See above. !!I 
Part (a) of the theorem characterizes when the unlimited transfer solution remains 
unaffected by restrictions on transfers. For example, if a mechanism financed by lottery-
draft is interim-efficient with unlimited transfers it remains so even with tight restrictions 
on transfers if [O, 1] c;;; A. Part (b) identifies when the solution is first best, in the restricted 
sense given the transfer technology. Part ( c) identifies when the solution differs from the 
unlimited transfer case in a substantial way. 
Also, 
Thus 
ICu(Q*) - U(Q')?: ICu(Q'*) - U(Q*')?: 0 
with one strict, which is a contradiction. 
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To answer the second question about the characterization in Theorem 6 we need to 
explore case (c) of the Theorem above more deeply. In particular, if .\v1 < v2 , ICu(Q) = 
U( Q), !Cu( Q) = U( Q), and Q = Q then can it be that Q E Interior ( QF )? The answer 
1s no. 
To see this, suppose Q does not lie on the right boundary of QF. Then there exists 
a point in QF, Q' = (Qi,Q 2 ) such that Qi> Qi and U(Q') 2: U(Q) (Lemma 12). If 
[Q', U(Q')] satisfies the incentive constraint for low cost types (U(Q') :<::: ICu(Q')) we are 
done since this will contradict Q maximizing 7rQ1 ( ,\ - f; V2) + (1 - 7r )Q2 ( 1 - f; V2) + 
7r(v2 - .\v1 )U(Q) subject to U(Q) :<::: ICu(Q). If [Q', U(Q')] violates incentive.compati-
bility for low cost types , then compare the mechanisms [Q', &'] with &; = U( Q') versus 
[Q, &] with &1 = U(Q). Since [Q', &']violates incentive compatibility for low types ~nd 
[Q, &] satisfies that same constraint, it must that&~ < &2 • This implies that there exists 
a way to finance Q' so that &; = &2 , in which case ( Q, &') is incentive compatible. But 
since Q' > Q this means that &; > U(Q). Therefore, we compare two mechanisms Q 
and Q', with 
(1) Q2 = Q~ 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
• •I 
a2 = az 
Q, < ¢; 
. •/ 
"''<a, 
where Q,&) satisfies (4.1) strictly and (4.2) is slack, and in (Q',&') (4.1) is slack. Since 
.\v1 < v2 , (Q',&') generates higher expected welfare than (Q,&). Furthermore, for all 
0 < e < 1, (Q"&,) = e(Q,&) + (1 - e)(Q',&') generates higher expected welfare than 
(Q,&), and will satisfy (4.1) and (4.2) if e is close to 1. 
Theorem 12 If [O, l] <;;;A*, then for any parameters (K, N, 11", Vi, v2, .\) there exists 
j* such that it is interim efficient to produce the public good iff the number of low types 
(v = v1 ) is 2: j*. 
4 Extensions 
4.1 Large Populations 
We consider a sequence of economies indexed by the number of agents in the population. 
As N increases, the total amount of private good needed to produce the public good 
T/{J\T\ T/"111.T\ 
is denoted K(1V) < N. We assume iimsup "JV'' =liminf ",\;' 1 = k and assume that 
N--+co N-+co 
O<k<l. 
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There are three parts of the optimization problem that can change as N grows: the 
objective function, the feasible set, and the incentive constraints. We first consider the 
effects on the feasible set. 
Because the right hand boundary of QF is piecewise linear for every N, the maximum 
difference Qi - Q2 is achieved at one of the vertices. This difference at a vertex is easy 
to compute. From equations (2) and (3) and the characterization of QF before Theorem 
1 we can characterize the sequence of feasible sets { Q~}. At each vertex except (0, 0), 
we have, for some m E {O, ... , N -1} 
Recall that vertex m corresponds to a mechanism whereby the public good is produced 
if and only if there are at least m low-cost-types. The next theorem follows immediately. 
Theorem 13 Fix 7r E (0, 1). For any c > 0, :IN* such that for all N 2'. N* 
Proof: From above, for every N, 
Qi - Qz:::; max 
m=l, ... ,N-1 
It is well known that the right hand side, which is the likelihood of the most likely number 
of successes out of N independent Bernoulli trials, converges to 0, as N gets larger. I 
Therefore, in the limit both types (interim) expect the same public good production, 
i.e. Q F converges to the set of all convex combinations between full production ( Q = 1) 
and no production ( Q = 0). It is important to note that this result depends only on the 
feasibility of allowing output to depend on the number of low types. The result does not 
even depend on K(N). It says nothing about whether the free rider problem gets better 
or worse in N, since incentive constraints play no role. 
By the linearity of the objective function, the interim efficient output will be an 
extreme point. If (A'lr + 1 - 7r) < k[A7rv1 + (1 - 7r)v2J then, in the limit, the interim 
efficient mechanism will have zero production. If (.\7r + 1- 7r) > k[A7rVi + (1- 7r )v2] then, 
in the limit, the interim efficient mechanism will have full production. This is essentially 
a law of large numbers result. The proportion of vi-types converges to 7r almost surely 
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in N. Consequently, in the limit economy the optimal Q is known to be either 0 or 1, 
depending on the direction of the above inequality. 22 Since Q1 - Q2 converges to 0 in the 
limit, incentive compatibility then implies that, in the limit, for any feasible Q, both types 
must have the same expected transfer. Optimality then implies that either a 1 = a 2 = 0 
or a 1 - a 2 = k, depending on whether Q is 0 or 1. Thus, incentive compatibility and 
feasibility imply that in the limit only lottery drafts (or equal payments if the endowments 
are divisible) are possible. 23 
4.2 Individual Rationality 
A natural constraint to impose on the choice of a mechanism is that, given the rules ( Q, a) 
and given a player's observation of type, vi, the player should agree to play the game. 
This leads to what are called interim individual rationality constraints. One interim 
individual rationality constraint is Q2 2 v2a 2 • By incentive compatibility, whenever this 
constraint is satisfied, low-cost types v1 will also automatically satisfy interim individual 
rationality, since Qi - vi ai 2 Q2 - Vi a 2 2 Q2 2 0. More specifically, since the incen~ive 
compatibility constraint, for a= ~Q, is ICL(Q) :S a 1 :S ICu(Q), the interim individual 
rationality constraint for high-cost types may be written: 
or 
°'1 ;:::: _ _.!:_Q2 1 - 7r + J( (2-Q) . 
v2 7r N 7r 
It is possible to find ai satisfying all of this if and only if 
(IR) Qi (_.!:_ - J() + Q2 [[_.!:_ - J(] - 7r [_.!:_ - J(]] 2 0. 
vi N v2 N vi N 
Thus as long as ~ v2 < 1, incentive compatibility guarantees that (IR) is not binding 
since Qi 2 Q2 =? (IR). Notice that ~v2 < 1 means that it would be ex post efficient to 
produce even if all N players had high costs. 
Geometrically (IR) defines a line through the origin in (Qi, Q2 ) space, with the (IR) 
constraint requiring Q to lie to the lower right of this line. If ~ v2 < 1, then the line has 
slope greater than 1 and lies above QF. If ~v2 > 1, then the line has slope less than 1 
and cuts through QF. If IR cuts the boundary of QF above the unconstrained solution, 
Q*, it is not binding. If IR cuts the boundary below Q*, it is binding and results in 
lower production (i.e. QjR < Q*). See Figure 3. In no case will IR lead to greater 
production than Q*. Notice that if the slope of IR is less than 1, the only mechanism 
that treats both types tl1e same ( Q1 = Q2 ) involves zero production. Therefore in 
22In the borderline case where k = " ""r~:-•) then in the limit every Q is optimal. 
7fV1 -1!" V2 
23More precisely, only mechanisms that generate the same interim expected utilities as a lottery draft 
are possible in the limit. 
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large populations, individual rationality constraints drive the optimal solution to zero 
production (Qi = Q2 = 0) whenever lim K!:')v2 > 1. 
N-oo 
This provides a simple geometric interpretation for the findings in Mailath and Postle-
waite (1990] 24 and Rob (1989]: in Bayesian public goods environments with independent 
types and some other minor restrictions (that rule out cases similar to Jim K!:')v2 '.':'. 1), N-oo 
the probability the public good will be produced goes to zero in the number of agents 
if interim individual rationality is imposed. Feasibility implies that, for any mechanism 
Qi ~ Q2 when n is large. By incentive compatibility, Qi ~ Q2 implies ai ~ a 2 • By 
individual nationality, 1 > kv2 implies Q 1 ~ Q 2 = 0 is the only possible mechanism. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The central finding of the paper is that interim efficient public goods provision is always 
of a particularly simple form: Given a welfare criterion ,\, the public good should be 
produced if the fraction of low cost types in the population is greater than or equal to 
i'j/l. The result continues to hold up when there are restricted transfers, even if transfers 
are entirely ruled out.25 
Furthermore, j*(>.) is decreasing in,\, the welfare weight on low-cost types. This has 
a intuitive interpretation. There is a natural benchmark, ,\ = .!!>., where total welfare is 
VJ ' 
neutral with respect to transfers and the public good is produced if and only if the sum 
of the benefits exceed its total production cost. Call this "efficient production." When 
,\ increases relative to this, there is a welfare gain by shifting the burden of the cost 
onto the high cost types, and by over-producing relative to efficient production (since 
low types favor production). When ,\ decreases, there is a welfare gain to shifting the 
burden onto low-cost types and (when v2 is sufficiently high) to reducing production of 
the public good. In many ways the latter case ( ,\ < ;;;- ) is a useful case to focus on. It 
corresponds to the common welfare criterion that "those who benefit the most should 
pay the most." Our result establishes that doing so entails a production inefficiency in 
the form of restricted output of the public good. 
A second set of findings relates to practical aspects of mechanism design. This is 
easily seen in the case of a very simple optimal mechanism when ,\ = .!!>.. In that case 
VJ 
the optimal solution can be implemented by simply having a vote between production 
and non-production. If the number voting in favor exceeds the critical level, j*(;;-), 
corresponding to production °efficiency, then the ·good is financed by randomly selecting 
K of N individuals to share the cost equally, a (conditional) lottery draft mechanism. 
Incentive compatibility implies that an equilibrium of this simple mechanism is for all 
24This is also closely related to an earlier result in Guth and }Iellwig [1986, Prop. 4.5J. 
25When there are restrictions on transfers, then the good may also be produced with some probability 
0 < q < 1 when the fraction of low-cost types exactly equals ri>.), 
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low types to vote "yes" and all high types to vote "no." 26 
Only slightly more complicated mechanisms are needed for other A f= .!!>. and in the 
VI 
case of transfer limitations. A ~ majority rule can still be used to determine whether the 
public good is to be produced, but a random tie-breaking rule when the number of Yes 
votes exactly equals j* may be needed when there are restricted transfers. In addition, 
lottery drafts are not generally optimal financing schemes unless j* = 0, A = :!!2., or 
VI j* :0:: K. In the last of these cases, then lottery draft financing may be optimal when 
the U(Q) transfer constraint is binding. In that case the lottery selects K out of the j* 
yes voters. The optimality of these simple mechanisms hinges on our assumption of only 
two types. More complicated mechanisms will typically be required to achieve optimality 
with more types, at least in small populations. 
This last kind of lottery is a special case of a more general type of financing that is 
optimal with limited transfers when the U( Q) transfer constraint is binding. We refe~ to 
this as "least cost," and it involves always producing the public good in a way that taxes 
high-cost types as little as possible, and low-cost types as much as possible. Theorem 
11 establishes that if the transfer constraints are binding, then the solution is either 
first-best (i.e. incentive constraints are not binding) or least cost. 
An important feature of all of these simple 2-stage mechanisms is that the stages 
separate the production decision (the voting stage) from the cost allocation decision (the 
lottery, or transfer, stage). In order for this separation to work, it may be important 
that the planners have confiscatory power. If v2 is large (or if a 1 or a 2 is large), then 
some players might not wish to make the transfers required in the second stage, or may 
not be willing to partake in the lottery. These ex post individual rationality problems are 
severe. In fact the last section of the paper shows the comparatively mild constraint of 
interim individual rationality generally leads to gross inefficiency in large populations. 
While we do not work out the details of the stronger ex post participation constraints on 
mechanisms, it is clear that a similar, negative result for large populations will emerge 
since ex post constraints are stronger than interim constraints. 
One extension would be to allow for continuous rather than discrete production tech-
nologies and continuous levels of contribution. As long as we restrict attention to Zin.ear 
technologies the main results remain unchanged. 
A second direction would be to allow for continuous types. As noted earlier, the 
characterization of optimal mechanisms relies on the restriction to two types. Elsewhere 
(Ledyard and .Palfrey [1989]) we have .begun to investigate the continuous type case 
when a regularity condition on the distribution of types is satisfied. That paper derives 
analogous versions of Corollary 7 and Corollary 8. When the continuous version of the in-
equality in Corollary 7 or Corollary 8 fails to hold, "feasible implementation" constraints 
on the reduced form correspo11ding to QF, U(Q) a.11d L(Q) play a role. Preliminary work 
260bserve how much simpler this is compared with the very complicated schemes based on Clarke-
taxes. (See, for example, Laffont and Maskin [1982] p. 76.) 
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on this indicates that those feasibility constraints are closely related to the conditions 
found in the auction literature (Matthews [1984], Maskin and Riley [1984], and Border 
[1991 ]). . 
Finally, a more difficult set of issues arise if we drop the assumption of quasi-linear 
preferences. The existence of income effects, arising from non-separability or from risk 
aversion due to nonlinearities in the valuation of the private good, poses formidable 
technical difficulties in the analysis. 
26 
Appendix: Some Lemmata 
We establish a few simple but useful properties about the set of feasible and incentive 
compatible mechanisms. 
Lemma 1: Let (Q,a) = {(Qi,ai)}~1 and (Q',a') = {Q",a1i)}~1 be two feasible and 
incentive compatible (but not necessarily symmetric) mechanisms. Then p E [O, 1 J =? 
[pQ + (1 - p)Q',pa + (1 - p)a'J is also feasible and incentive compatible. 
Proof: Incentive compatibility of the new mechanism follows from the linearity of utility 
in Vi, °'i and Q;. Feasibility follows because one can produce the new allocation rule as 
a compound lottery in the following way. First, everyone reports their types; then the 
planner uses a public randomizing device to choose (Q,a) with probability p and (Q',a') 
with probability (1 - p). I 
Lemma 2: Let P = { (Qi, ai)}~1 be feasible and let 
w = t ~ [,\JrVi(Q~, aL v1) + (1 - K)Vi(Q~, a~, v2)]. 
i=l 
There exists a feasible symmetric mechanism P = (Q,&) such that KA(Q1 - v1&1 ) + 
(1 - 1r)(Q2 - v2&2) = w. Furthermore, if Pis incentive compatible then Pis incentive 
compatible. 
Proof: By the symmetry of the problem (i.e. the form of everyone's utility function is the 
same and everyone has symmetric priors) {QP(iJ,ap(i)}~1 is feasible and incentive com-
patible for every p : {1, ... , N} -+ {1, ... , N} that is one-to-one (i.e. every permutation 
operator). By the convexity property established in Lemma 3, every mechanism in the 
conv~x hull of the set of all such r!'ermutations of P is feasible and incentive compatible. 
Let P be the equally weighted [by~!] convex combination of the permutations. Then 
Qi = iv 2::~1 Qi for all i and &i = iv L; ai for all i, so F is symmetric both mechanisms 
generate the same ex ante social value. I 
In view of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms. 
The next lemma is standard for incentive compatible mechanisms. 
Lemma 3: Let v1 < v2 . If (Q, a) is incentive compatible then: 
V(Q,a,v1)::;: V(Q,a,v 2 ) 
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(A.l) 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
Proof: By incentive compatibility we have: 
Since V1 < v2 , we get 
V(Q,a,v1) 2: Q2 -v1a2 
V(Q,a,v2) 2: Q1 - v2a1 
Therefore, (A.3) follows immediately; (A.4) follows from 
[Qi - v1a1] - [Qi - v2a,J 2: [Q2 - v1a2] - [Q2 - v2a2]. 
(A.1) then follows from (A.4) and from Q1 2: Q2 + v,[a1 - a 2]. We need to show that 
efficiency requires balanced budgets. I 
Lemma 4: If ( Q, a) is feasible then 
J{_ 
a>-Q 
-N 
Proof: Suppose not. Then contributions are on average insufficient to produce theoutput 
on the right hand side of the inequality. This means that for some j, ja}+(N- j)a] < J{ qj, 
which violates feasibility. II 
Lemma 5: Suppose (a',a 2,q) is feasible. Then ja} + (N -j)a} = I<q1 for all j if and 
only ifa= ~Q. 
Proof: Follows immediately from the feasibility constraint that ja~ + (N - j)a] 2: l<qj 
and from equations (2) and (3). II 
Lemma 6: If (a, Q) solves (P) then a= j;§Q, where a= 1ra1 + (1 - 1r)a2 and Q = 
1rQ1 + (1 - 1r )Q2. That is interim efficient mechanisms do not waste resources. 
Proof: Suppose (a, Q) solves (P) but that a> ~Q. By Lemmas 4 and 5, there is some 
k' E {O, ... , N} such that 
k'ai, + (N - k')az, > kqk'· 
We will show this implies (Q,a) cannot solve (P). We consider four cases. 
Case 1: At the optimum (Q,a), Q1-v1a 1 > Q2-v1a2 and Q2-v2a2 > Q, -v2a,. Then 
at the optimum neither ( 4.1) nor ( 4.2) is binding. Therefore, increase qk' a little or lower 
one of at, or a1, a little. This is not possible only if qk' = 1, at,= max{g, K-(1;;:-k)a} 
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d 2 - { K-k7i} If 1 an ak, - max g, -k,- . ak' = max{Q, K-(~-k)a} then ai, =a> Q· Therefore, 
2 _ K-k'a d , _ - Th 
ak, - N-k' an ak' - a. us, 
k'a~ + (N - k')ai, =I< - (N - k')a+ I< - k'a = 2K - Na 
and 
k'a~ + (N - k')ai, = k'a + (N - k')a =Na. 
Therefore Na= I<. But Na> I<. If a~,= Q then a%, = Q and 
kqk' < k'a~, + (N - k')a~, = NQ :S 0. 
But qk' 2 0, which is a contradiction. 
Case 2: At the optimum, Qi - a1v1 = Q2 - a 2v1 and Q2 - a 2v2 = Qi - aiv2. Thus 
Qi= Q2 = Q and ai = °'2 =a. Suppose that a> )?1Q. Let 6i = 62 = ~Q. (Q,&) is 
feasible since one can let a%= al= {?1qn'rlk. Then 
Therefore ( Q, a) was not optimal. 
Case 3: At the optimum, (Qi-Q2) < v2(ai-a2) and (Qi-Q2) = vi(ai -a2)· A decrease 
in ai, keeping Qi, Q2, a 2 constant will improve E and satisfy (4) if feasible. If k' > 0 
and al, > qkmax { £, K-(~ -k)x} + (1 - qk)max { £, -(N ;k)x} then such a change is feasible 
b d · i If k' 0 1 { K-(N-k)x} (l ) { -(N-k)x} h y re ucmg ak'· = or ak' = qkmax £, k + - qk max J;., k , t, en 
a%,> qkmax{±, f,(;::.'tj} + (1-qk)max{±, ;;;~~}so we need to show that one can feasibly 
reduce a%,, and for some k" cl k' ( k" < N) increase a%,, in such a way that a 2 remains 
unchanged, and at the same time reduce al,,. Such a k" exists unless, for all k cl k' 
( k < N) either 
(1) al= qkmax {±,I< - (~ - k)x} + (1 - qk)max { ±, -(N; k)x}, k > O 
or (2) a%= qkmin { x, 1~ ~ k:} + (1 - qk)min { x, ;;:±k} 
i { K - (N - k)x} { -(N - k)x} 
or (3) k = 0, ak, = qkmax £, k + (1 - qk)max £, k 
If (1), then al :S gk~, so (N- k)a% 2 Kqk. If (2) or (3), then al :Sa%. Therefore, 
Na% 2 kal + (N - k)a% 2 I< qk for k = 0, 1, ... , N - 1 and Na%, > k'qk' which implies 
a2 > {?1Q2. But vi(ai - a2) = (Qi - Q2) < v2(ai - a2) implies ai > °'2· Therefore 
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ai > a2 > ~Q2. If ai :'.'.'. -%Q1 then let a1 = ~Q1, and a2 = ~Q2. Then (Q,&) yields a 
higher value for E than ( Q, a) and we have a contradiction as long as ( Q, a) is incentive 
compatible. If (Q,&) is not incentive compatible, then for same E close to 0, (Q,&,) is 
incentive compatible, where&,= c& + (1 - c)a. Since (Q, &,) yields a higher value of E 
K K than (Q,a), we have a contradiction. Thus NQ 1 :'.'.'. a 1 > a2 > NQ2. Thus 
But 1 >~vi. Therefore (Qi - Q2 ) > vi(a1 - a 2), a contradiction. 
Case 4: At the optimum (Qi - Qz) = v2(ai - a2) and (Qi - Q2) > v1(ai - a2). A 
decrease in a 2 , keeping Q and a 1 fixed will improve E and satisfy (4) if feasible. If 
k' < N and az, > qkmax { _:r, t:.;::.k,;)} + (1 - qk)max { _:r, N~~} then such a change is feasible 
by reducing a%,. If k' = N or a%, = qkmax { _:r, U:.,-_k,;)} + (1 - qk)max { _:r, N~~} then 
al, > qkmax { _:r, K-(~-k)X} + (1 - qk)max { _:r, -(Nk-k)x}. So we need to show that one can 
feasibly lower al, and, for some k" of k' (k" > 0), increase al,, in such a way that a 1 
remains unchanged, and at the same time reduce a%,,. Such a k" exists, unless for all 
k of k' ( k > 0) either: 
( 2 K I If 1), then ak :'.'.'. N-k so kak :'.'.'. Kqk. If (2) or (3), then a% :::; al. Following a similar 
argument to Case 3, we get 
If 1 :::; v2~ then (Qi - Q2) < v2(ai - a 2), a contradiction. 
the optimum. But then a 1 = a 2 , a contradiction. QED. 
If 1 > ~v2 then Q2 = Qi at 
11 
n• 11 · ;i -f 1 1 b r •1 1 1 rY> • • • • • r1na.<~' '"le prov1 ...... e a very usei.u1 _1_emma a -out ieas101e ana emc1ent mechanisms with 
limited transfers which allows us to work entirely in the space of reduced-form mecha-
nisms. First, given a feasible Q =(Qi, Q2), we define two values, U(Q) and L(Q), which 
correspond to the maximum and minimum expected payment of a low type. 
30 
U(Q) =max o:1 subject to (2), (3.1) and fork= 0, ... , N, qk E [O, l] and 
(*) ak :S qkmin { x, J{ - (:- k)Jd.} + (1 - qk)min { x, -(N; k)Jd.}. 
L(Q) =min o:1 subject to (2), (3.1) and fork= 0, ... ,N,qkE[O,lJ and 
(**) ai'.Sqkmax{,12,I<-(~-k)x}+(l-qk)max{.,12,-(N;k)x}· 
Lemma 7: Suppose a= ~Q. (Q, a) is feasible if and only if Q is feasible and L(Q)::; 
0:1 :S U(Q). 
Proof: (only if) Since ( Q, a) is feasible, 3 feasible ( q, a1, a2 ) such that kak + (N - k )a~ = 
T/ £ k 0 N s· - KQ 1 Kq,-(N-k)a% £ II k s· ( ) . £ "bl 1l.. qk ior = , ... , . 1nce a = N , a k = k 1or a . ince a, q is 1eas1 e 
(1.5) and (1.6) are true. (1.6) implies ( **) while (1.5) implies ( * ). Thus, L( Q) :S o:1 :S 
U(Q). 
(if) Given Q feasible, we know by definition that (Q,au) and (Q,o:L) are feasible 
where o:f = U(Q), o:f = L(Q), o:V = [~Q - iro:f] (i~,,.), and o:f = [~Q- iro:f] (i~,,.). 
That is, there are feasible [qu,aw, a2u] which with ( Q, au) satisfy (2) and (3). Similarly, 
there are feasible [qL, a1L, a2LJ which with (Q, o:L) satisfy (2) and (3). Thus if Q is 
feasible and L(Q) ::; o:1 ::; U(Q) and a = ~Q then there is a µ E [O, l] such that 
o:1 = µL( Q) + (1 - µ )U( Q). Therefore, µ[qu, aw, a2uJ + (1 - µ )[qL, a1L, a2LJ is feasible 
and, together with (Q, a), satisfies (2) and (3). II 
Lemma 8: Let S be the slope of the indifference lines of the objective function for the 
maximization problems in Theorems 2, 3, 4. 8S/8>.. 2 0 or Q* = 1. 
Proof: >.. :S v2 /v1 implies 
S= 
where the denominator is > 0. Differentiation and simplification give: 
[
(v2-v1)] 
sgn(8S/8>.) = sgn vi > 0. 
For>..>;;;, if 1 2 ~v2 then Q* = 1 and we are done. For 1 < ~v2 , 
S = ir [ (;!;- - ~) (>..v1ir + (1 - ir)v2) + t;-(v2 - vi)] 
-(1 - ir) (:, - ~) (>..v1ir + (1 - ir )v2) 
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Differentiation and simplification give: 
Sgn (~~) = Sgn [- (:
2 
- ~) (v2 - vi)(l - ?r)J > 0. 
Lemma 9: If [O, l]tA* and 1 > -Riv2 , then for all QtQp, 
L(Q) '.".: ~Qi'.".: ICL(Q) '.".: ICu(Q) 
• 
Proof: The last inequality follows from v1 '.".: v2 and Q1 ;:::: Q2 , since QEQp. Now at the 
solution to L( Q), 
{ 
K-(N-k)} { -(N-k)} K 
al = qkmax ;r, k + (1 - qk)max ;r, k '.".: Nqk. 
Thus L(Q) '.".:~Qi. Finally ~Q1 '.".: ICL(Q) if and only if 0 '.".: (;2 - -Ri) (l - ?r)(Q1 - Qz) 
if and only if 1 ;:::: ~v2 . I 
Lemma 10: If [O, l]EA* and 1 > ~v2 , then for all QEQp, 
J( 
U(Q);:::: NQ1;:::: ICL(Q) 
and 
L(Q) '.".: ~Qi'.".: ICu(Q). 
Proof: Since [O, l]EA*, al > ~qk is always feasible. Thus U(Q) ;:::: ~Q1 ;:::: L(Q). The 
rest follows from Q1 ;:::: Q2 , v1 '.".: v2 , ~v1 '.".: r '.".: ~ v2 • I 
Lemma 11: Let 1J = (a,q) = [a6, ... ,a}-.r,a5,. . .,ai,q0 ,. .. ,qN] as in Section 2.2. 1J 1s 
feasible if and only if 
qk E [0,1] 
kal + (N - k)az::::: Kqk 
a~= O,ai = 0 
and ak EA*= CO(X) for i = 1,2 
and, fork= 1,. . .,N -1, 
{ K-(N-k)x1 ( -(N-k)x1 al ;:::: qkmax ;r, , > + (1 - Qk )max { ;r. . ~ 
l IC)'., l k J 
2 { K - kx} { -kx } ak ;:::: qkmax ;z;, N _ k + (1 - qk)max ;r, N _ k 
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(i.l) 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
(1 .. 5) 
(1.6) 
Proof: We need to show; there is a feasible symmetric direct mechanism µ yielding 
'f/ = ( a1, a2, q) if and only if (1.1 )-(1.6). The set of feasible symmetric direct mechanisms 
when there are two types is S = {µ : { 0, ... , N} --+ M( Z1 )} where µ( k) is the measure 
Z, the feasible (x,y), when there are exactly k vi equal to v1. µES yields 'f/ if and only 
if µ(k) yields (al, a%, qk) for k = 0, ... , N. 
(only if) Suppose µ E S yields 'f/· Then qk = µ( k)( { z E Zly = 1} ), and a{ = 
E(xilv' = v;,µ(k)), the expected value of xi under the measure µ(k) conditional on 
vi= v;. Let x;k = E(x'lvi = v;,µ(k),y = t), fort= 0,1, the conditional expected value 
of x' for µ(k) conditional on v' = v; and y = t. Then a{ = qd{k + (1 - qk)xbk· It 
is now easy to see that (1.1) (1.3) and (1.4) are true. (1.2) follows from the fact that 
k#>k + (N - k)x5k:::: 0 and kxh + (N - k)xik:::: K. It also follows from these facts and 
co(X) = [;ic, x], that 
. {- kt-(N-k);ic} ,; { kt-(N-k)x} 
mm x, k :S x, :S max ;ic, k , . 
(1.5) and (1.6) follow from these. 
(if) (Given (a, q) satisfying (1.1)-(1.6), we need to identify an appropriate µ E S. 
Given (1.5) and (1.6) we can choose x;k E co(X) for j = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1 such that 
a~= qkxik + (1 - qk)x~k 
and 
kx~k(N - k)xik:::: tK. 
Now let µ,(k) E M(XN) be the measure on {(x1 , •.. ,xN)} such that the probability is 
one that, for all i, x' = x;k if vi= Vj. Then let µ(k) be the measure where µ((x,y)) = 
qkfl,1(k)(x) if y = 1 and µ((x, y)) = (1- qk)P,0 (k)(x) if y = 0. iii 
To see why (1.5) and (1.6) are necessary consider an example: X = {O, 1 }, K = 
3, N = 10, k = 2. For y = 0, the only feasible xi = 0 for vi = v1 and vi = v2 • Therefore, 
x~k = 0. For y = 1, the largest x6k is 1 and the smallest is 0. The corresponding 
values of x5k are ! and ~ respectively. Now (1.5) is al :::: qkmax{O, 3- 2(3)} = 0 and (1.6) 
is a~ :::: qkmax{O, V = qk~· If we were to try to find a feasible direct mechanism to 
implement qk = ~, al = 1, a% = 0 which satisfies kal + ( N - k )a% = qkK we would not be 
able to do it even though (1.1) to (1.4) are satisfied. Because al= 1, x]k = 1 for j = Q, 1. 
Therefore it must be true that x5k = -~ but x2 must be either 0 or 1. Constraints (1.5) 
and (1.6) protect against this. 
Lemma 12: Suppose A*= [O, 1]. Let Q E QF and Q2(Q1) < Q2 < Q1 < 1. Then there 
exists Q; such that: 
(a) Q; > Qi 
(b) Q' = (Q;,Q2) E QF 
(c) U(Q'):::: U(Q) 
33 
Proof: Let {(qk,a~,a~)}f~o be a mechanism for which the reduced form outputs are 
Q = (Q1 , Q2 ) and the reduced form taxes are a= (a1 , a 2) with a1 = U(Q), and a= ~Q. 
First note that since Q is in the interior of QF, there exist k1 , k2 with k1 > k2 > 0 such 
that qk' E (0, l] and l' < 1. This follows from the characterization of QF given in the 
proof of Theorem 6. Furthermore, since a 1 = U(Q), we must have a~ = qk min{ 1(,, l} 
for k = 1, ... , N. Consider an increase of qk' to q'k' = l' + ti. 1, and a corresponding 
decrease of qk' to q'k' = l' - Ci 2 , such that Q2 remains fixed, so: 
This results in a new value Q;, given by 
To establish (c), observe that it is feasible to finance (Q;, Q~) exactly as (Q1 , Q2 ) was 
financed, except: 
a;ki · a~' + L'i. 1 min {~, 1} 
a;k2 aI' - t,. 2 min { ~:, 1} 
Using a similar argument as before, it follows from k1 > k2 that: 
Therefore U(Q') > U(Q). • 
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1 
rf + 3rr(l - rr)2 
. rr3 + 3ii!(I - rr) l 
rf + 3rr(l - rrJ°i 
Figure 1. The set Op when N = 4. 
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rr3 + 3if(l - Jt) 
rr3 + 3Jc1 - Jt) ' 1 
_! - -
,? + 3it(l - itf 
Figure 2. Optimal reduced form public good production for 
two welfare weights, A.< A.'. Optimal levels are 
vertices marked Q*(A.) and Q*(A.'), respectively. 
Level surfaces of the objective function, E(Q1, Qz), 
are marked EA, and EA,1 respectively, with arrows 
indicating the direction of the gradient vector. 
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1 
rr3 + 3rr(l - rrf 
Q*(A.) 
rr3 + 3Jo - rr) ' 1 
' r2l + 3rr(l - rrf 
Figure 3. Effect of individual rationality constraint, IR. 
The unconstrained solution, Q*(J,) > Qfu_(J .. ), the 
IR-constrained solution. When IR constraint is 
binding, solution lies on boundary, but not 
typically on a vertex. 
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